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LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
STUDENT CITIZENS IN SAFE HAVENS? 
Jacqueline A. Stefkovich 
& 
Judith A. Miller· 
Police involvement in school searches has become a contro-
versial issue since the Supreme Court, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1 
refused to express an opinion on what constitutes a legal search 
when school officials act "in conjunction with or at the behest of 
law enforcement agencies."2 The T.L.O. Court classified school 
personnel as state officials for Fourth Amendment purposes, but 
allowed them broad authority to conduct searches under the 
"reasonable suspicion" standard, a less restrictive standard than 
the "probable cause" standard generally required of police offi-
cers.3 
However, the T.L.O. decision generates more questions than 
answers when police and security guards are involved in the 
investigation of students. This is especially true when trying to 
determine what standard applies to the search. When the fram-
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1. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The initials T.L.O. stand for Terry 
Lee Owens the student involved in the case. At the time the case went to trial, Terry 
Lee Owens was 14 years old. Because she was a minor, the legal system protected her 
by identifying her with initials only. This means of identification is often used with 
minors. 
2. Id. at 341, n.7. 
3. See id. at 341. 
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ers of the United States Constitution included the Fourth 
Amendment in the Bill of Rights, they did so to protect the pri-
vacy and security of all Americans from arbitrary invasions by 
government officials. They did not anticipate that one day this 
country would have a large public school system, and that the 
school officials would be so concerned with violence and safety 
that they would need the assistance of the police in conducting 
student searches. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that "the right of people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation par-
ticularly describing the person or thing to be seized."4 
For many years, the United States Supreme Court found the 
Fourth Amendment inapplicable to public school students. Up 
until the late 1960s, search and seizure was not really an issue 
in public schools. Accepted methods of discipline fell under the 
in loco parentis doctrine. 5 In loco parentis means that school 
officials stood in the place of parents in maintaining supervision 
and discipline of students. 
Teachers and administrators "enjoyed many of the same 
rights and privileges afforded to parents in matters of safety, 
discipline, and the general well-being of school children."6 More 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is important to note that the U.S. Constitution 
protects citizens only against unlawful interference or infringement of their rights by 
the government. Public school officials are considered government agents. Thus, while 
public school students are protected by the Bill of Rights, students in private schools 
are not. 
5. The legal term for the relationship between teacher and student is in loco 
parentis or in the place of the parent. Blackstone, in his commentaries, stated: 
a parent may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to 
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has 
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz, that 
of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for 
which he is employed. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453. Originally, in loco parentis gave teachers 
and administrators almost unlimited authority in disciplining students. The doctrine 
applied when students were in school, en route to and from school, and at school 
sponsored activities in and away from school. 
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over, under the doctrine of in loco parentis, school officials, like 
parents, were considered private individuals, not officials of the 
state.7 As a result, they were not subject to the constraints of 
probable cause and search warrants specified in the Fourth 
Amendment. 
It followed that if parents could search their children and 
take from them things that they considered unacceptable, school 
officials could search the same children at school and seize ma-
terials deemed inappropriate in the school setting.8 In the case 
In re Donaldson,9 a California court of appeals held that in mat-
ters of discipline, the school stood in loco parentis which in-
cluded the right of school officials to conduct searches. 10 The 
Donaldson court even allowed the use of "moderate force" in 
obtaining obedience from students just as parents had the right 
to use force to gain obedience from their children. 11 
By classifying school searches as falling under the in loco 
parentis theory, the courts were able to side step the question of 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus, T.L.O. clarifies that the reasonableness standard applies 
to searches by school officials. As long as school searches were 
for harmless contraband, such as bubble-gum, spit balls, water 
pistols, or pea shooters, neither the courts nor anyone else 
gave much consideration to the rights of children to be free 
from teachers' searches. A handful of bubble-gum, if confis-
cated from a student's pocket, did not seem to raise a constitu-
tional issue. However, once school officials began discovering 
illegal drugs and dangerous weapons like guns, knives, and 
razor blades on school property, search and seizure became an 
issue in public schools. 12 
6. M. Teresa Harris, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: New Standard of Review or New 
Label?, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 157, 163-64 (1985). 
7. See id. at 164. 
8. See David Alden Walls, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Fourth Amendment Applied 
to School Searches, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 225, 230 (1986). 
9. 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
10. Seeid. at 223. See also Dale Edward F.T. Zane, Note, School Searches Under 
the Fourth Amendment: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 72 CORNELL L. REV. 368, 378 (1987). 
11. In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 223. 
12. John C. Hogan and Mortimer D. Schwartz, The Fourth Amendment and the 
Public Schools, 7 WHITIIER L. REV. 527, 529 (1985). 
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No longer were students simply breaking the rules, they were 
committing crimes in school. School officials were confiscating 
evidence of those crimes and, in many instances, handing the 
evidence over to the police. 13 
As a result, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark 
case of New Jersey v. T.L.O. in 1985.14 The Court found that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures applied to public school officials under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 15 New Jersey v. T.L.O. laid to rest the concept of in 
loco parentis as the basis for a school's authority: "In carrying 
out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such 
policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not 
merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the 
parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amend-
ment."16 
Even more important was the Court's establishment of the 
reasonable suspicion standard which clarified the criteria under 
which school officials could conduct student searches. 17 However, 
the Court refused to clarify what constituted a legal student 
search by school officials working with the police. This paper 
attempts to outline what constitutes a legal search in such cir-
cumstances. 
The remainder of this article is divided into the following 
parts. Part II examines issues of school safety and violence, 
setting the stage for understanding the nature of police involve-
ment in schools and why it has become such an important legal 
issue. Part III describes students' Fourth Amendment rights in 
schools and the legal standards used in conducting student 
searches. Part IV concentrates on the doctrines to consider in 
13. In many states school officials are required by law to hand over to police any 
evidence of a crime committed in school. Common types of evidence confiscated from 
students include drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, and money. See generally CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-154a (West 1998). 
14. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
15. "It is now beyond dispute that 'the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officer§.' 
Id.at 334 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
16. Id. at 336-37 (emphasis added). 
17. See id. at 342. Under the reasonable suspicion standard, school officials must 
have a reasonable belief that the search will uncover evidence that the student(s) 
committed a crime or violated a school rule. They must also limit the search so that 
it is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student(s) and the 
nature of the offense. 
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framing a standard to be used when police are involved in school 
searches. Part V discusses the standards used when police are 
involved in school searches. Part VI discusses the dilemma 
raised due to the ambiguous role of school security guards, who 
may act as school officials or law enforcement officers. Part VII 
summarizes the legal issues and problems arising from police 
involvement in schools and proposes that students be subject to 
the same legal standards as adults when police and security 
guards are involved in school searches. 
II. SCHOOL SAFETY AND VIOLENCE 
A. The Rise of Police Involvement in Public Schools 
At the time New Jersey v. T.L.0. 18 was decided, there was 
mounting concern for the safety of students in public schools. In 
the opinion, Justice White stated: 
Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substan-
tial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining 
order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent 
years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: 
drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major 
social problems. 19 
Justice White made reference to a 1978 study by the Na-
tional Institute of Education, (NIE) which surveyed principals, 
teachers, and students on the large extent of criminal activity in 
schools across the nation. 20 The NIE survey, however, was only 
18. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
19. !d. at 339. 
20. !d.; See Keith Baker, Research Evidence of a School Discipline Problem, Pm 
DELTA KAPPAN, March 1985, at 483-85 (noting that in the NIE study, data on criminal 
activity were gathered on a monthly basis and included the following statistics during 
the period studied: 282,000 students were physically attacked; 112,000 students were 
robbed through force, weapons or threat; 2.4 million students had personal property 
stolen; 800,000 students stayed home because they were afraid to attend school; 6,000 
teachers were robbed; 1,000 teachers were assaulted and required medical attention; 
125,000 teachers were threatened with physical hann; more than 125,000 teachers 
encountered at least one situation in which they were afraid to confront misbehaving 
students; one out of two teachers was on the receiving end of an insult or obscene 
gesture; 2,400 fires were set in schools; 13,000 thefts of school property occurred; 24,000 
incidents of vandalism occurred; 42,000 cases of damage to school property occurred). 
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one of a series of surveys on school violence conducted at that 
time. 21 
President Ronald Reagan made school safety an issue in a 
1984 radio address. Pointing out that violence in schools nega-
tively affects learning and teaching, Reagan called on the coun-
try to begin solving discipline problems.22 At the same time, he 
directed the Justice Department to establish the National 
School Safety Center (NSSC). Funded by a grant from the office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the NSSC fo-
cused on providing a central headquarters to help school board 
members, educators, law enforcement officials, lawyers, commu-
nity leaders, and the general public promote safety and aca-
demic excellence.23 
In the early 1990s there was even more public concern for 
school safety. The results of polls conducted by a variety of orga-
nizations ranging from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany to the National Rifle Association reflected these concerns. 24 
21. See Gary L. Bauer, Restoring Order to Public Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 
March 1985, at 490 (noting that in 1983, two years before T.L.O. was decided, the 
Detroit Free Press surveyed Michigan teachers and found that 46 percent had been 
threatened with violence during the past year; one out of five had been assaulted by 
a student. In the same year, a Boston study found that 63 crimes had occurred for each 
100 students, and one out of four high school students admitted to carrying a weapon 
to school. Further, half of Boston's teachers had been victims of crime five or more 
times during the school year. And another survey, conducted by the National Education 
Association, found that 28 percent of all teachers across the nation had been victims 
of theft or vandalism; 4.2 percent had been attacked by students; and over 90 percent 
of teachers surveyed stated that student misbehavior had "deleterious" effects on their 
teaching). 
22. See Ronald Reagan, The President's Radio Address to the Nation on 
Education, reproduced in AM. EDUC., Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 2-3. 
23. See George Nicholson, An Introduction to the National School Safety Center, 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, March 1985, at 492. 
24. See CNN News: NSBA Study Shows Increased Violence within Schools (CNN 
television broadcast, Jan. 5, 1994) (transcript on file with author) (noting that in its 
survey of over 700 school districts representing thousands of schools, the National 
School Boards Association found that violence had increased 82 percent over the last 
five years, crippling students' ability to learn); How School Districts are Responding to 
Violence, EDUC. USA, Jan. 17, 1994, at 6 (showing a large majority of school officials 
believed school violence had increased during the previous five years and that three-
fourths of the 720 who responded to the NSBA poll reported that their schools had 
dealt with violent student-on-student incidents in 1993, and 13 percent reported a 
knifing or shooting); Back to School Survey, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 5, 1993 (noting 
that the National Rifle Association found that one-third of parents surveyed worried 
about gun violence in schools and that twenty percent of the parents reported that their 
children were concerned about the presence of guns in schools) Survey Finds School 
Violence Hits 1 in 4 Students, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.17, 1993, at 37 (reporting that in the 
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At the same time, the media reported numerous instances of 
shootings and other violent incidents in schools.25 These occur-
rences often involved the police.26 As Jessica Portner noted: 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) survey, nearly one in four students and 
one in ten teachers said they had been victims of violence on or near school property). 
25. See, e.g., WEAPONS: A DEADLY ROLE IN THE DRAMA OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE, 
CENTER NEWS SERVICE, 1993 (noting how, in Junction City, Kansas, a 14-year-old was 
accidentally shot in the head after an argument between boys resulted in gunfire and 
on that same day, in Atlanta, Georgia, a 15-year-old student was shot and killed in a 
crowded lunch room by a fellow student with whom he had been feuding, wounding 
another student in the scuffie); Carol Innerst, Pistol Packing Kids Put Schools on Alert: 
School Officials Find More Students Armed, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 1A (stating 
that in Queen Annes County, Maryland, there have been incidents involving middle 
school children carrying guns and in Montgomery County schools, incidents of students 
carrying and using guns, stunners, and localizers quadrupled). 
26. See Sam Dillon, On the Barricades Against Violence in Schools: As Fears over 
Security Grow, New York's School Safety Force Struggles to Keep Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
24, 1993, at B1 (stating that 3,000 uniformed, but unarmed, security officers are posted 
in schools throughout New York City, their main mission-to protect students and staff, 
and that the force is the country's ninth largest police agency with 990 vehicles and 
a budget of 73 million dollars); Alison Mitchell, Giuliani Sees Role for Police in the 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1993, at B1 (reporting that school police, though armed 
with only handcuffs and radios, are peace officers with authority to make arrests and 
they have their own training academy and report to the Board of Education's Division 
of School Safety); Joseph P. Fried, Queens Experiment to Fight School Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at B5 (reporting that school officials and community members at 
Rockaway High School in Queens, New York want a more expanded police presence to 
help faculty teach students about the dangers of guns and violence and to resolve 
conflict in nonviolent ways); Todd J. Gillman, Securing Our Schools: Badges in the 
Halls, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1A (reporting that forty-six school 
districts in Texas have their own police departments that handle gang violence); Aline 
McKenzie, Mesquite District Approves Police in Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 
15, 1993, at 12 (reporting that like other school police in Texas, these resource officers 
wear uniforms, are armed, and their primary function is to provide increased security 
and to teach and counsel students); Carol lnnerst, Pistol Packing Kids Put Schools on 
Alert: School Officials Find More Students Armed, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 1A 
(reporting that in Oakland and Los Angeles, California, and even in places as small as 
Oakeville, Wyoming, bullet drills are commonplace, and in Tacoma, Washington, 
security officers and principals wear bullet proof vests); Rochelle L. Stanfield, Safe 
Passage, NAT'L J., Sept. 25, 1993, at 2305 (reporting that in Indianapolis school security 
officers meet sixth to twelfth graders as they walk into school); Lauren Robinson, $16.3 
Million is Asked for Safer Schools: Boston Task Force Targets Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 24, 1992, at 2 (reporting that Boston's City-wide Youth Safety Committee has 
requested 16.3 million dollars to be spent over the next three years to stop violence in 
public schools); Susan Reed, Reading, Writing, and Murder, PEOPLE, June 14, 1993, at 
44 (noting that teachers in Rochester, New York placed safety ahead of salary in their 
labor negotiations, and in Dade County, Florida, 14 million dollars was budgeted for 
school security); Laura Wisniewski, State Plans Task Force on Violence in Schools, 
ATLANTA J., July, 20, 1993, at D1 (noting that an Atlanta task force comprised of 
educators, law enforcement officials, and business leaders sought creative solutions to 
school violence other than metal detectors and police officers). 
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[T]wenty years ago, most school officials would never have 
dreamed of allocating their precious resources to hire armed 
police to protect campuses. If increased security was required 
for a football game or a school dance, a district typically hired 
security officers for the night .... Today, more than 50 school 
districts have spent millions of dollars to set up professionally 
trained school police forces that operate around the clock. In 
the late 1970s, there were fewer than 100 school police officers 
in the United States. Today, there are more than 2,000. 27 
Shortly after Portner made her observations, Congress 
passed the Safe Schools Act of 1994. This act, among other 
things, allowed school districts with high rates of crime, vio-
lence, and disciplinary problems to compete for federal grants. 28 
These grants could be used for a variety of violence prevention 
and school safety issues. Up to one-third of each grant could be 
spent on metal detectors or hiring security guards. 29 While this 
federal program focused on developing long-term goals and 
strategies to prevent violence in schools, the framers of this 
legislation also recognized a need to increase the presence of 
security guards in schools. Thus police and quasi law enforce-
ment officers became increasingly involved in public schools for 
a variety of reasons ranging from protection of students to edu-
cation programs, such as peer mediation and crime prevention. 
B. The Nature of Police Involvement in Public Schools 
Police involvement in searches may take on many faces, such 
as patrolling schools, participating in crime-prevention pro-
grams, teaching about drug abuse and prevention, and dealing 
with truancy. It can also ultimately affect students' Fourth 
Amendment rights. There are a variety of ways police become 
involved in school searches. 
27. Jessica Portner, Cops on Campus, 13 EDUC. WEEK 26, 30, June 22, 1994. 
28. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 5961, 5962 (1998). School districts that develop a 
comprehensive, long term plan to combat and prevent violence could receive as much 
as three million dollars per year for a period of up to two years. School districts, 
however, must be able to show evidence that they have experienced a high rate of 
murders committed by youth; school expulsions, suspensions, or alternative placements; 
youth involvement in the criminal justice system; and crimes in which youth are 
victims. 
29. See id. at § 5965(a)(13). 
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First, police may give tips to school officials that a crime has 
been committed or is about to be committed on school property. 
In this situation the police have shared information with school 
administrators but have not told them what to do with the infor-
mation. Second, police may give tips to school security guards. 
The information shared usually relates to criminal activity, 
warning the guards that a crime has been committed on school 
property. Third, police may become involved in school searches 
when they investigate a crime that started outside of school. 
Fourth, school officials may request police presence to witness a 
search or to act as consultants.3° Fifth, police are involved in 
school searches when they are called into school to help with a 
discipline problem and end up conducting an investigation and 
then a search. In the latter situation, police may be the fact 
finders, make the decision to search, and direct and conduct the 
search with the outcome being possible criminal prosecution for 
the student. Police may also simply "stand by" while school offi-
cials conduct a search. In this latter capacity, police are present 
but involved neither in the fact-finding nor in the search. Sixth, 
police may be involved in school searches when they are hired 
by school districts. In such situations, police help deter crime by 
patrolling the halls and school grounds. Finally, they also do 
routine police work in a school setting.31 
School security guards are also involved in school searches. 
Because these guards are hired to assist with school safety and 
discipline, they are in a unique position to witness a crime oc-
curring and to conduct a search. As employees of the school dis-
trict, they are familiar with their assigned school. They get to 
know students and staff and gain their trust. As a result they 
develop networks of communication, which provide crucial infor-
mation that leads to finding students who have broken school 
rules, who have committed a crime, or who are about to commit 
a crime.32 
30. See, e.g., LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW & JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2d ed. 1995). 
31. See id. 
32. See Judith A. Miller, How Police Involvement in Public School Searches 
Creates a Dilemma in Determining the Applicable Fourth Amendment Standard: 
Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause (1996) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Temple 
University) (on file with author). 
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Security guards become involved in school searches when 
they receive a tip from the police or when they assist a school 
administrator with a search. As part of their job, school security 
officers often patrol parking lots, which could result in searching 
students or their automobiles. Finally, security officers may be 
involved in school searches through the use of metal detectors. 
They may use hand-held detectors or install monitor detectors 
that are installed to search students and staff for weapons. 33 
III. New Jersey u. T.L.O.: THE STANDARD FOR 
SEARCHING STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
New Jersey u. T.L.O.was the first Supreme Court opinion to 
address the Fourth Amendment rights of students in public 
schools.34 The Court set a reasonableness standard for searching 
students>15 Although the standard of reasonableness was clearly 
defined in T.L.O., the Court's decision was limited to personal 
searches ofindividual students by school administrators and did 
not address the standard needed for school searches involving 
police officers.36 
A. Facts of New Jersey u. T.L.O. 
In 1980, at Piscataway (New Jersey) High School, a teacher 
discovered two students smoking in a lavatory.37 One of the stu-
dents was T.L.O., a fourteen-year-old ninth grade student.38 The 
teacher took both students to the office because smoking was a 
violation of school rules. 39 The assistant principal, Ted Choplick, 
questioned both students.40 T.L.O.'s companion admitted that 
she had been smoking and so was suspended. T.L.O., however, 
denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory. She also 
claimed that she did not smoke at all. 41 
33. See id. 
34. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
35. See id. at 341. 
36. See id. at 342-43. 
37. See id. at 328. 
38. See id. 
39. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
25] SCHOOL SEARCHES BY POLICE 35 
At that point in the investigation, the assistant principal 
asked T.L.O. to come into his office.42 He demanded to see her 
purse.43 When he opened T.L.O.'s purse, he found a pack of ciga-
rettes.44 He then removed the cigarettes from the purse.45 In the 
process of removing the cigarettes, he also saw a package of 
cigarette rolling papers.46 The assistant principal's previous 
experience had led him to the conclusion that possession of roll-
ing papers by high school students was associated with mari-
juana use. 47 This led him to search T.L.O.'s purse for further 
evidence of drug use.48 His search revealed a small amount of 
marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial 
quantity of one dollar bills, an index card containing a list of 
students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters implicating 
T.L.O. in marijuana dealing.49 The assistant principal notified 
T.L.O.'s mother and the police and turned over to the police 
evidence ofT.L.O.'s drug dealing.50 At the police station, T.L.O., 
in the presence ofher mother and the police, admitted to selling 
marijuana in school.51 
B. Procedural History of New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
The State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. based 
on her confession and the evidence seized by the assistant prin-
cipal. 52 T.L.O. contended that the assistant principal's search of 
her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 53 As a result, 
she moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse. She also 
moved to suppress her confession, which she claimed was 
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search.54 Finding the search 
reasonable, the juvenile court denied T.L.O.'s motion to suppress 
the evidence. 55 The court held that T.L.O. was a delinquent and 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. at 328-29. 
52. See id. at 329. 
53. See id. 
54. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329. 
55. See id. at 328. 
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sentenced her to one year of probation.56 On appeal, a divided 
state court affirmed the finding that the search was reasonable 
but vacated the delinquency judgment. 57 The case was remanded 
to determine "whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily 
waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing."58 
T.L.O. appealed the court's ruling that the search was legal 
under the Fourth Amendment.59 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court agreed with the lower courts that the Fourth Amendment 
applies to school officials but held that the search conducted by 
Mr. Choplick was unreasonable.60 The school rule that T.L.O. 
was accused of violating was smoking in the lavatory.61 Posses-
sion of cigarettes, as revealed by the search, was not in violation 
of school rules. 62 Hence, the search was not justified. 63 Moreover, 
Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. possessed 
cigarettes.64 Finally, the court held that the evidence of drug use 
Mr. Choplick found in the purse did not justify his "rummaging" 
through its contents.65 The New Jersey Supreme Court also 
maintained that the exclusionary rule is applicable to juvenile 
proceedings.66 Therefore, if school officials violate a student's 
Fourth Amendment rights through means of an illegal search, 
then evidence confiscated during the search would not be admis-
sible in subsequent criminal proceedings.67 
The State of New Jersey appealed this decision to the United 
States Supreme Court on the exclusionary issue only. 68 On ap-
peal the question was "whether the exclusionary rule should 
operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings 
of evidence unlawfully seized by a school official without the 
involvement of law enforcement officers."69 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari but, upon reconsideration, decided this ques-
56. See id. at 330. 
57. See id. 
58. !d. 
59. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 330. 
60. See id. at 330-31. 
61. See id. at 328. 
62. See id. at 331. 
63. See id. 
64. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 330. 
67. See id. at 331. 
68. See id. 
69. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331. 
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tion could not be answered in isolation from the Fourth Amend-
ment issue.70 After hearing arguments from both sides, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the search ofT.L.O.'s purse was reason-
able and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 71 Because the 
search was legal, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to 
exclude the evidence was erroneous. 72 However, the Court re-
served opinion about whether the exclusionary rule would apply 
if the search had been illegal. 73 The Court stated: 
[l]n holding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, we do not implicitly determine that 
the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches 
conducted by school authorities. The question whether evi-
dence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves 
two distinct inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and whether the 
exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation. 
Neither question is logically antecedent to the other, for a 
negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of 
the case. Thus, our determination that the search at issue in 
this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no 
particular resolution of the question of the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule. 74 
C. The T.L. 0. Standard for School Searches 
T.L.O. is important because it set reasonable suspicion as 
the standard for searching students in public schools.75 This 
means that a school official may properly conduct a search of a 
student if, in consideration of all the circumstances, the official 
has a reasonable belief that a crime or violation of school rules 
has been, or is in the process of being, committed.7!i To deter-
mine whether reasonable suspicion existed, the court developed 
a two prong test. 77 First, the search must be justified at its in-
ception, (i.e., school officials from the very beginning must rea-
sonably believe that the search will uncover evidence of a viola-
70. See id. at 332. 
71. See !d. at 332-33. 
72. See !d. at 348. 
73. See !d. at 333 n.3. 
74. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333. 
75. See !d. at 341. 
76. See Id. at 341-42. 
77. See !d. at 341. 
38 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1999 
tion of law or a school rule). 78 Second, the scope of the search 
must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and 
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the stu-
dent and the nature of the infraction."79 
The reasonable suspicion standard is different from the 
stricter Fourth Amendment probable cause standard the police 
must meet to search citizens. Probable cause exists "when facts 
and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he 
has reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense 
has been or is being committed."80 The police generally need to 
present this information to a magistrate to secure a warrant to 
search. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has found 
that absolute application of this rule in all situations would 
greatly hamper police work. For this reason, the Court created 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.81 
The reasonable suspicion standard affords students in 
schools fewer protections than are normally afforded to citizens 
under the stricter probable cause standard. The reason for this 
is that the rights of students in schools must be balanced 
against the administrator's duty to maintain order and disci-
pline in school.82 In T.L.O. the Court found that "the school set-
ting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches 
by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant re-
quirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school 
environment ... [and] would unduly interfere with the mainte-
78. Id. at 341-42. 
79. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1081 (6th ed. 1990). 
81. See RICHARD D. STRAHAN & CHARLES TuRNER, THE COURTS AND THE SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATOR AND LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT TODAY 134 (Longman Press, New York) 
(1987). When police search ordinary citizens, they need probable cause and a warrant 
unless they search under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. These 
exceptions include searches conducted: (a) incident to a valid arrest; (b) under exigent 
circumstances (generally used to ensure that evidence is not destroyed, when there is 
danger to life, or when police are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect who would otherwise 
escape); (c) when evidence is in "plain view"; (d) after consent is obtained; (e) relative 
to the "stop and frisk" doctrine and (f) as inspections or regulatory searches. If there 
is an exception to the warrant requirement, then the reasonable suspicion standard or 
the probable cause standard or neither may apply depending upon the exception or the 
circumstances. For instance, consent requires no suspicion at all, while "stop and frisk" 
searches require some suspicion but not probable cause. 
82. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
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nance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in 
the schools."83 
Furthermore, the T.L.O. court maintained that by focusing 
attention on the question of reasonableness, this standard 
would: 
[S]pare [school officials] the necessity of schooling themselves 
in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate 
their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common 
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should 
ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more 
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving 
order in the schools.84 
Thus, T.L.O. clarifies that the reasonableness standard applies 
to searches by school officials. 
IV. DOCTRINES TO CONSIDER IN FRAMING A 
STANDARD FOR POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL 
SEARCHES 
While T.L.O. established the standard for public school offi-
cials to search students in schools, the decision did not state 
which standard would apply to searches by the police in schools. 
The Court observed: 
We here consider only searches carried out by school authori-
ties acting alone and on their own authority. This case does 
not present the question of the appropriate standard for as-
sessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in 
conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, 
and we express no opinion on that question.85 
Neither did the T.L.O. court speak of the standard that should 
be applied to those in the schools performing quasi police func-
tions, such as security guards. 
Before discussing these standards in any depth, several 
bright-line laws created by the courts need to be considered. 
First, police (who are generally required to use a probable cause 
standard in conducting searches) may not use school officials 
83. !d. 
84. !d. at 343. 
85. Id. at 341 n.7. 
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(who have the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion) to search 
students and then ask the officials to hand them the evidence on 
a "silver platter."86 Similarly, the appropriate standard for 
police-related searches in schools will be determined by who is 
the agent of the search. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the 
exclusionary rule states that evidence obtained through an ille-
gal search may not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. 
A. The Silver Platter Doctrine 
At the time ofthe U.S. Supreme Court's decision in T.L.O., 
there was concern that police would abuse the reasonable suspi-
cion standard. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
T.L.O. case, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) wrote 
an amicus curiae brief87 requesting the Court to apply the proba-
ble cause standard to the search and seizure of a juvenile by a 
school official or to affirm the decision of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court.88 The ACLU argued that juvenile students, like 
adults, are persons whose rights are protected from intrusion by 
the U.S. Constitution.89 
The ACLU was further concerned that the reasonable suspi-
cion standard would infringe on students' rights by allowing 
police to receive evidence of a crime from school officials without 
having to enter the school, without satisfying the requirement of 
probable cause, and without obtaining a warrant. Moreover, 
under the reasonable suspicion standard this evidence could be 
used to convict a student of a crime. What made the reasonable 
suspicion standard even more of a concern at the time was the 
existence in some states (like New Jersey) of a mandate requir-
86. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960). 
87. Amicus curiae, or friend of the court is defined as: 
A person with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action 
may petition the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of 
a party but actually to suggest a rationale consistent with its own views. 
Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals concerning matters 
of a broad public interest. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990). In T.L.O. the broad public interest was the 
violation of a student's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and 
seizure. 
88. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey in support of affirmance for Respondent 
at 39, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (No. 83-712) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
89. See id. at 3. 
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ing school officials to report any criminal acts to the police.90 
Similarly, local school boards had policies requiring school offi-
cials to notify the police when a crime had been committed in 
school. This factor strengthened the ACLU's argument in favor 
of applying the exclusionary rule in T.L.O.'s case.91 
The thrust of this argument was that school officials would 
be able to search a student under a lesser standard, obtain evi-
dence of a crime, and turn that evidence over to police "on a 
silver platter" for use in the criminal prosecution of the stu-
dent.92 The ACLU argued that, just as the Court had struck 
down the silver platter doctrine in Elkins u. United States,93 the 
Court should not allow the police to benefit from a rule permit-
ting school officials such broad discretion in conducting searches 
under the guise ofmaintaining discipline. 94 
B. Agency Theory 
Commentators have voiced concern about the danger of po-
lice abuse of the reasonable suspicion standard. This concern 
emanates from the Court's refusal to delineate a standard gov-
erning school searches in conjunction with or at the behest of 
law enforcement agencies.95 What is the appropriate standard to 
90. See id. 
91. See id. at 4. In its brief the ACLU explained that "applying the exclusionary 
rule would inhibit collusion between school officials and the police, deter arbitrary and 
unchecked searches of students by school officials, and provide a meaningful mechanism 
for discouraging unwarranted invasions of the right of juveniles to be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures." 
92. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 87 at 23. The silver platter doctrine allowed 
evidence obtained illegally by state officials to be admissible in federal prosecutions 
because no federal official had participated in the violation of the defendant's rights. 
The doctrine was struck down in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), when the 
Supreme Court noted that such a distinction became patently illogical once the Fourth 
Amendment became applicable to the States. 
93. 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960). 
94. See id. at 221-22. As the Court reasoned in Elkins, although cooperation 
between various governmental entities is to be encouraged, where one of those entities 
is not entitled to conduct a search in order to obtain evidence, it can neither directly 
nor indirectly encourage another entity to obtain such evidence nor accept such evidence 
from the other governmental entity. See also Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 87 at 23. 
95. See, e.g., Patrick K. Perrin, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protection in the 
School Environment: The Colorado Supreme Court's Application of the Reasonable 
Suspicion Standard in State v. P.E.A., 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 169 (1990) (noting that 
school searches are the only category of searches that allow a full-scale search for 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing based on less than probable cause, and that the 
flexible reasonable suspicion standard could lead to abuses by school officials and the 
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apply when police become involved in school searches? Professor 
Van Geel commented on the dilemma associated with the stan-
dard: "When police collaborate with school officials in student 
searches, the collaboration is often viewed as a police search, 
invoking the stricter probable cause standard. [Knowing this,] 
school officials might tend to shy away from working with police 
which could lead to no collaboration or possibly covert collabora-
tion."96 On the other hand, "when police and school officials col-
laborate extensively, a real danger exists that the police will try 
to circumvent the stricter probable cause standard in favor of 
the less stringent reasonable suspicion standard."97 
The problem with identifying the appropriate standard in 
schools is the difficulty in determining whether the police are 
acting alone, or as agents of the school, or if school officials con-
ducting the searches are acting as agents of the police. Several 
courts have proposed tests to determine whether an agency rela-
tionship exists. In Illinois v. Gates,98 the United States Supreme 
Court proposed that in deciding whether a search was valid, a 
"totality of the circumstances" must be considered. In State v. 
P.E.A. the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted this test as also 
applying to a determination of agency.99 
The Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Snowadzki 100 provided a more 
specific test to determine whether an agency relationship exists. 
This test, however, relies heavily on the subjective state of mind 
of school officials and police. 101 This test has two parts: whether 
the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct 
(search) and whether the party (school official or school security 
officer) intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further 
his own ends. 102 
police). 
96. Tyll Van Gee!, The Safe & Orderly School, THE COURTS AND AMERICAN 
EDUCATION LAW 315, 334-35 (1987). 
97. Id. at 335. 
98. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). See also Williams by Williams v. Ellington, 936 F. 
2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Alabama v. White, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (1990)) (maintaining 
that totality of the circumstances is also applicable to the reasonable suspicion 
standard). 
99. 754 P.2d 382, 385 (Colo. 1988). 
100. 723 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984). 
101. See Perrin, supra note 95, at 172. 
102. See id. at 171-72. 
25] SCHOOL SEARCHES BY POLICE 43 
C. The Exclusionary Rule 
Many commentators favor applying the exclusionary rule to 
evidence obtained in searches of students by school officials and 
turned over to the police. 103 One reason for this is that the 
exclusionary rule acts as a deterrent to law enforcement officials 
by keeping them from engaging in unconstitutional searches. 
Another reason is that judicial integrity is at stake if the court 
allows the use of tainted evidence.104 A third reason is that the 
government should not profit from its own wrongdoing. This 
means that if the government discovers evidence in an unlawful 
search, it should not benefit from its own lawlessness by using 
tainted evidence. Commentators argue that when such occur-
rences happen in schools, students who see their teachers en-
gaging in unlawful searches without consequences will not be 
encouraged to obey the law. 105 
These concerns are not unlike those of Justice Brennan who 
dissented against setting aside the probable cause standard for 
determining the validity of a school search.106 Expressing his 
concern over the importance of student privacy issues, Justice 
Brennan stated in T.L.O. that "the Court fails to cite any case in 
which a full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been 
justified on less than probable cause."107 He noted that "catego-
ries of intrusions that are substantially less intrusive than full-
scale searches and seizures may be justifiable in accordance 
with a balancing test even absent a warrant or probable cause, 
provided that the balancing test used gives sufficient weight to 
the privacy interests that will be infringed."108 Justice Brennan 
goes even further, stating that school districts should consult 
court decisions and other legal materials and "prepare a booklet 
expounding the rough outlines of the concept [of probable cause 
103. See, e.g., Charles W. Harden, Jr., Searching Public Schools: T.L.O. and the 
Exclusionary Rule, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1099, 1111-14 (1988). 
104. See id. n.104 at 112-13. "If a court tolerates official lawlessness by allowing 
use of tainted evidence seized by a school authority, students 'cannot help but feel they 
have been dealt with unfairly' and their once well-founded respect for the judiciary may 
be forever lost." 
105. See id. See also Jefferson L. Johnson and Donald W. Crawley, T.L.O. and the 
Student's Right to Privacy, 36 EDUC. THEORY 211, 221 (1986). 
106. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
107. ld. at 360. 
108. Id. at 355. 
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and distribute it to teachers to] ... provide them with guidance 
as to when a search may be lawfully conducted."109 
Similarly, Justice Stevens in his T.L.O. dissent, expressed 
the fear that the reasonable suspicion standard would allow 
school officials to search students under suspicion of the "most 
trivial" violations of school rules.no "For the Court, a search for 
curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code 
is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of her-
oin addiction or violent gang activity."111 Stevens argued that 
the T.L.O. decision would permit school administrators to search 
students to enforce school rules in a wide variety of situations, 
including secret societies, use of parking lots, attendance at 
athletic events, and unauthorized absences. 112 
While Justice Stevens was willing to adopt an exception to 
the warrant requirement, he believed that the appropriate stan-
dard would permit a search only when a school official had rea-
son to believe that "the search will uncover evidence that the 
student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seri-
ously disruptive of school order, or the educational process."m In 
his conclusion, Justice Stevens stated, "The rule the Court 
adopts today is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth 
Amendment virtually meaningless in the school context. Al-
though I agree that school administrators must have broad lati-
tude to maintain order and discipline in our classrooms, that 
authority is not unlimited."114 
A number of commentators agreed with Stevens' view that 
the "reasonableness under all the circumstances" test leaves 
itself open to abuse. 115 One school official's definition of reason-
able may not agree with that of another official. 116 Such discrep 
109. Id. at 365-66. This argument, however, overlooks the difficulty that even 
experienced police officers sometimes have in understanding and applying the probable 
cause standard. 
110. ld. at 371 <Stevens, J., dissenting). 
111. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 377 (1985). 
112. See id. at 377 n.16. 
113. Id. at 378 (emphasis in original). 
114. ld. at 385. 
115. See, e.g., John A. Hamilton, The United States Supreme Court's Erosion of 
Fourth Amendment Rights: The Trend Continues, 30 S.D. L. REV. 574, 594-95 (1985). 
116. See id. But see Joseph R. McKinney, The Fourth Amendment and the Public 
Schools: Reasonable Suspicion in the 1990s, 91 ED. LAW REP. 455, 457 (1994); J.M. 
Sanchez, Expelling the Fourth Amendment from American Schools: Students' Rights Six 
Years after T.L.O., 21 J.L. & EDUC. 381, 409 (noting that the vast majority of Fourth 
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ancies leave the door wide open for police to abuse the reason-
able suspicion standard by using, in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding, evidence gathered in a search of a student who broke a 
school rule. 117 
V. STANDARDS USED WHEN POLICE ARE INVOLVED IN 
SCHOOL SEARCHES 
While T.L.O. did not specifically address the standard to be 
used when police and school security guards are involved in 
school searches, lower courts and legal commentators have of-
fered opinions on this topic. A review of cases and commentary 
implies that the standard may vary depending upon the nature 
of the involvement. The more that police and security guards are 
involved in the investigation leading up to the search, in the 
decision to search, and in the actual search, the more likely the 
court will enforce the stricter probable cause standard. When 
involvement is limited, courts are more apt to allow the search 
under the reasonable suspicion standard. 
A. The Probable Cause Standard 
In general, the probable cause standard is required when the 
police initiate the search or when the search is done at the be-
hest ofthe police.118 When school officials search at the urging of 
the police, they act as agents of the police. In such situations, 
police are involved before the actual search. For example, in 
Picha v. Wieglos, 119 a phone call tipped off school officials that a 
student was in possession of illegal drugs. 120 School officials 
called the police before gathering any additional facts. 121 The 
reason for involving police was to uncover evidence of a crime. 
Reasoning that police involvement at the outset turns a search 
into a hunt for contraband, the Picha court found that such a 
search went beyond the school's interest in maintaining disci-
Amendment cases in schools are decided in favor of the school district). 
117. See Gwendolyn G. Combs, Note, How the Fourth Amendment Applies to Public 
High School Students - New Jersey v. T.L.O., 6 MISS. C. L. REV. 149, 167 (1986). 
118. See Perrin, supra note 95, at 169 (noting that the majority of courts that have 
considered the issue indicate probable cause as the appropriate standard). 
119. 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
120. See id. at 1216. 
121. See id. 
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pline. 122 Therefore, a search done at the behest of the police had 
to meet the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.123 
Courts often distinguish between police searches for evi-
dence of a criminal violation and those searching for evidence of 
a violation of a school rule. The latter instance rarely requires a 
probable cause standard while the former often does. For in-
stance, in F.P. v. State124 the police were investigating a bur-
glary .125 In the process, a police officer questioned a middle-
school student, who told him that F.P. had shown him car keys 
and an "automotive paper."126 The student also told the police 
that F.P. said he had a stolen car. 127 The police officer then told 
the school resource officer, an employee of the sheriff's office, 
who worked at the school.128 The resource officer was paid by the 
school board, but handled law enforcement matters in the 
school. 129 The school resource officer found F.P. 130 After summon-
ing the police, she took him to her office and asked if he had 
anything to give her. 131 F.P. put car keys and the automotive 
paper on the officer's desk. 132 The police officer joined F.P. and 
the resource officer. 133 F.P. was given Miranda warnings by the 
police officer.134 F.P. waived his rights and admitted that he had 
found the keys and paper on a car behind a rental agency and 
that he had intended to drive the car around later that day. 135 
The state appeals court reversed the trial court stating that 
the school official exception to the probable cause requirement 
for a warrantless search does not apply when the search is car-
ried out at the behest of the police. 136 Because the resource offi-
cer acted at the behest of the police officer, the state had to 
122. See id. at 1221. 
123. See id. 
124. 528 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
125. See id. at 1254. 
126. !d. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 1254, 1254 n.l. 
129. See F.P., 528 So. 2d at 1254, n.l. 
130. See id. at 1254. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See F.P., 528 So. 2d at 1254. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. at 1255. 
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prove that F.P. consented to the search or that there was proba-
ble cause to believe that F.P. had violated the law and possessed 
evidence of that violation. 137 
B. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard in Individual Searches 
The reasonable suspicion standard generally applies when 
school officials request the police to conduct a search. For exam-
ple, in Martens u. District No. 220/38 the school's dean of stu-
dents, Joan Baukus, received an anonymous tip that a student 
kept drug paraphernalia in the lining of his coat. 139 Ms. Baukus 
brought the student to her office and confronted him about the 
information obtained from the anonymous tip. 140 The student 
denied that he possessed a controlled substance and refused to 
consent to a search until his parents were contacted. 141 Mean-
while, Officer Hentig, a sheriff's deputy, arrived at the school on 
another matter.142 He came to the assistant principal's office and 
spoke to the student encouraging him to cooperate with school 
officials. 143 The deputy then asked the student to empty his 
pockets and the student did so. 144 In his pockets was a pipe con-
taining marijuana residue. 145 The student was suspended from 
school but faced no criminal charges as a result of the search. 146 
In finding for the school district, the court stated that there 
was a basic difference between Martens and T.£.0. 147 In T.L.O. 
the entire investigation and search was conducted by school 
officials. 148 In Martens, the search was done at the urging of and 
in the presence of the deputy. 149 Despite the official presence of 
Hentig as a law enforcement officer, the court held that reason-
able suspicion was the appropriate standard because of the rela-
tively limited role played by the deputy. 150 More specifically, the 
137. See id. 
138. 620 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
139. See id. at 30. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. at 31. 
143. See Martens, 620 F. Supp. at 31. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. at 32. 
148. See Martens, 620 F. Supp. at 32. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court found that the 
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search was conducted in the administrator's office.151 Officer 
Hentig had nothing to do with developing the facts that insti-
gated the search nor did he direct school officials to detain and 
search Martens. 152 
In short, Hentig's urging was the immediate cause of Marten's 
[sic] emptying his pockets, but there is no indication that a 
criminal investigation was contemplated, that this was a coop-
erative effort with law enforcement, or that but for this inter-
vention Martens would not have been searched eventually .... 
[And t]here is ... no basis for thinking that school official ac-
tion was a subterfuge to avoid warrant and probable cause 
requirements. 153 
The reasonable susp1c10n standard may also suffice in 
searches involving a "tip" passed on to school officials from the 
police, but where the police do not actually conduct the search. 
State v. P.E.A. 154 involved a police officer who was investigating 
a bicycle theft at the local junior high school. 155 During the ques-
tioning of a student, he discovered that two high school students 
had stolen marijuana from a backyard, dried it, cured it, and 
packaged it with the intent to sell it to other high school stu-
dents that morning. 156 The officer went to the high school and 
advised the assistant principal of these allegations. 157 The officer 
was asked to remain at the school while the assistant principal 
investigated.158 
The assistant principal asked the school security officer to 
help investigate the officer's report. 159 The two students were 
questioned and searched in separate rooms. 160 The investigation 
produced no evidence, but the students stated that they came to 
school in P.E.A.'s car. 161 P.E.A. was then questioned and 
higher standard of probable cause had been met. 
151. See id. 
152. See id. 
153. Martens, 620 F. Supp. at 32. 
154. 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988). 
155. See id. at 384. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 384. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. 
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searched. 162 After first lying and claiming he had ridden the bus 
to school, P.E.A. admitted that he had driven his car. 163 The 
security officer took P.E.A.'s keys, which were found in the 
search and searched the car despite P.E.A.'s objection. 164 The 
security officer found marijuana in the car. 165 The police officer 
was not present during the questioning or searches of the stu-
dents.166 
The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether 
the assistant principal and security officer acted as agents of the 
police.167 According to the court, the agency rule prevents the 
police from circumventing the Fourth Amendment by having a 
private individual conduct a search or make a seizure that 
would be unlawful if performed by the police themselves. 168 Fur-
ther, the acquisition of evidence by an individual acting as an 
agent of the police must be viewed by the same Fourth Amend-
ment standards that govern law enforcement officials. 169 
The P.E.A. court refused to find that an agency relationship 
existed: 
The focal issue in this case is whether P.E.A.'s [F]ourth 
[A]mendment rights were violated when school officials ques-
tioned and searched him, and then searched his car and seized 
marijuana that belonged to F.M .. If the questioning which led 
to the search had been by law enforcement officials, the consti-
tutionality of the search would be determined under the proba-
ble cause standard of the [F]ourth [A]mendment. Since the 
search was incidental to the maintenance of order by school 
officials and the protection of other students and was not per-
formed by individuals acting as agents of the police, the prose-
cution maintains that acts of the principal and security officer 
are to be governed by standards set forth in New Jersey u. 
T.L.O .. We agreeP0 
The court found that the only police involvement in the search 
occurred when the officer told the assistant principal that stu-
162. See id. 
163. See id. 
164. See P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 384. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. at 385. 
168. See id. 
169. See P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 385. 
170. Id. at 386 (citation omitted). 
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dents were planning to sell marijuana in school. 171 The officer 
remained at school, but the assistant principal carried out the 
investigation.172 
The reasonable suspicion standard may also be appropriate 
in situations where police are present, but the search is initiated 
and conducted by school officials. In Cason v. Cook, 173 two stu-
dents told the assistant principal that they were missing belong-
ings from their gym lockers. 174 The assistant principal asked a 
police officer, who was assigned to the high school as a liaison 
officer as part of a cooperative program between the school dis-
trict and the police department, to accompany her to the locker 
room where she investigated and learned the names of four girls 
who were in the locker room at the time of the thefts. 175 Cason 
was one of these girls. 176 
These students did not have permission to be in the locker 
room nor had they been in gym class the prior period. 177 The 
assistant principal also asked the officer to accompany her as 
she interviewed each girl. 178 The officer remained in the hallway 
and did not participate in the questioning of one student. 179 The 
officer was present during the investigation of Cason although 
she did not participate in the questioning. 180 
After Cason admitted to being in the locker room, the assis-
tant principal searched her purse and found a coin purse match-
ing the description of the one stolen. 181 The officer did a pat 
down search.182 Both students were taken to the office and given 
juvenile appearance cards by the officer. 183 The appearance 
cards required them and their parents to report to the officer at 
171. See id. at 385-86. 
172. See id. at 385. 
173. 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987). 
174. See id. at 189-90. 
175. See id. at 190. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. 
178. See Cason, 810 F.2d at 190. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. See Cason, 810 F.2d at 190. 
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the police station. 184 The girls were suspended and no further 
action was taken. 185 
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit faced the very issue that T.L.O. refused to ad-
dress: what standard applies "when a search is conducted by 
school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law en-
forcement agencies."186 The court specifically examined whether 
the reasonableness standard as stated in T.L.O. should apply 
when a school official acts in conjunction with a police "liaison" 
officer. 187 
In finding that the reasonableness standard was appropri-
ate, the court found no evidence that any activities were at the 
behest of a law enforcement agency. 188 Instead, the court stated 
that a school official had conducted the investigation, limiting 
the officer's involvement to a pat down search completed after 
incriminating evidence had been discovered. 189 Moreover, the 
court found that the officer's presenting of juvenile appearance 
cards was, at most, a police officer working in conjunction with 
school officials. 19° For these reasons, the court held that the im-
position of a probable cause warrant requirement based on the 
limited involvement of the police officer would not serve the 
interest of preserving swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
in schools. 191 
In Commonwealth u. Carey, 192 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court treated police participation as a marginal issue. 193 In this 
case, two high school students told a teacher that Carey, a se-
nior, had brought a gun to schooU94 The teacher reported this 
information to the assistant principal who, in turn, told the prin-
cipal.195 The administrators had never dealt with a gun before, 
so they immediately called the police.196 When the police officer 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. !d. at 191 (emphasis added). 
187. !d. 
188. See Cason, 810 F.2d at 191. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. at 192. 
191. See id. at 193. 
192. 554 N.E. 2d 1199 (Mass. 1990). 
193. See id. See also Sanchez, supra note 116 at 401. 
194. See Carey, 554 N.E.2d at 1200. 
195. See id. 
196. See id. at 1201. 
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arrived, he and the school administrators questioned Carey 
about the gun. 197 After searching Carey and finding no gun, the 
administrators searched his locker where they found a sawed-off 
twenty-two caliber rifle, a gun sight, a black powdery substance, 
and a bullet. 198 These were turned over to the police~99 As a 
result, Carey was advised of his Miranda rights. 200 
After Carey was convicted of unlawfully carrying a firearm, 
he appealed on the grounds that involvement of a police officer 
required application of the stricter probable cause standard. 201 
The Massachusetts court disagreed, holding that school officials 
conducted the search on their own without the aid of the police, 
even though the police officer participated in Carey's question-
ing.202 Further, the court agreed with the lower court, which 
maintained that the police had no input in the school administra-
tor's plan and were notified for safety reasons. The court cited 
the testimony of the assistant principal "that school administra-
tors were very, very uptight and very nervous about the possibil-
ity that there was a gun in school, both for themselves and for 
the school community of some 1,200 students and ninety to one 
hundred employees."203 
In another case involving police in a school search, a Califor-
nia appellate court upheld the use of reasonable suspicion when 
police searched a student at the request of school officials. In the 
case of People v. Alexander B.,204 members of a gang told the 
dean of students that a member of a rival gang was carrying a 
gun in school.205 The dean directed the police officer to investi-
gate the group to see whether anyone had a weapon. 206 The offi-
cer searched the group and found that Alexander B. had a ma-
chete knife. 207 Alexander B. was arrested.2°8 At the trial he filed 
a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the police 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. See Carey, 554 N.E.2d at 1201. 
200. See id. 
201. See id. at 1200. 
202. See id. at 1202. 
203. Id. at 1201 n.2. 
204. 270 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
205. See id. at 342. 
206. See id. at 343. 
207. See id. 
208. See id. 
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conducted the search and therefore needed probable cause. 209 
The court denied the motion stating that the police officer acted 
at the request of school officials and, therefore, the appropriate 
standard was reasonable suspicion. 210 
C. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard in Administrative 
Searches 
Another line of cases considers searches that are administra-
tive or regulatory in nature to be satisfied through the use of a 
reasonableness standard regardless of police involvement. In 
1995, the United States Supreme Court rendered its second and 
only opinion since T.L.O. on the Fourth Amendment rights of 
students in public schools.2n This decision, Vernonia School 
District 47J u. Acton, upheld random drug testing of student 
athletes. 212 Police were not involved in the school's drug testing 
program and evidence obtained through the program was not 
turned over to the police. This decision is important because it 
holds administrative searches in schools to the same standard 
used in previous Supreme Court decisions addressing the rights 
of adults. 
In determining the legality of administrative searches in 
schools, the Supreme Court balanced the intrusiveness of the 
search on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against 
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 213 Because 
administrative searches have been characterized by most courts 
as being relatively unintrusive and as involving a low degree of 
danger, students' Fourth Amendment interests are often out-
weighed by a legitimate governmental interest. For students in 
public schools, this may mean a search for drugs or weapons will 
be held constitutional. 
While the Supreme Court has yet to grapple with the issue of 
police involvement in public school searches, including searches 
which are administrative in nature, numerous lower courts have 
rendered opinions on this topic. Cases addressing administrative 
209. See Alexander B., 270 Cal. Rptr. at 343. 
210. See id. at 344. See also Sanchez, supra note 116, at 403 (concluding that the 
court chose to ignore the presence and role of the police officer and instead addressed 
only reasonable suspicion as it applied to school officials). 
211. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
212. See id. at 666. 
213. See id. at 664. 
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searches that involve police or security guards generally fall into 
three broad areas. These include metal detector searches, mass 
or random locker searches, and canine sniff searches.214 
1. Metal Detector Searches 
People u. Dukes215 was the first recorded decision addressing 
the use of metal detectors in schools. This case involved Taw ana 
Dukes, a student at the Washington Irving High School in New 
York City who was scanned with a hand-held metal detector by 
Jessica Wallace, a member of a team of special police officers 
from the Central Task Force for School Safety.216 Ms. Dukes' bag 
was then scanned and the device signaled the presence of 
meta1. 217 Officer Wallace asked Tawana to open her bag. 218 The 
officer reached in and removed a manilla folder which contained 
a switchblade knife. 219 Ms. Dukes was arrested and charged with 
criminal possession of a weapon. 220 She moved to suppress this 
evidence on the ground that her Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated. 221 
Rather than using the test for reasonableness as outlined in 
the T.L.O. decision, the Dukes court instead characterized this 
search as a type of administrative search, which "is never linked 
with probable cause or the issuance of a warrant."222 The court 
maintained that because this type of search is intended to pre-
vent a dangerous occurrence and is aimed at a group or class of 
people, it does not require individualized suspicion.223 The Dukes 
court likened this kind of search to those using scanning devices 
in public buildings (e.g., airports and court houses) or highway 
checkpoints for drunken drivers. 224 Citing the Supreme Court's 
214. The lead case setting the standard for administrative searches in schools is 
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which dealt with drug testing 
of student athletes. This article does not discuss the Vernonia case in detail because 
police were not involved in the search at issue in the case. 
215. 580 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992). 
216. See id. at 851. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 851. 
221. See id. 
222. ld. 
223. See id. at 851-52. 
224. See id. at 852. 
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opinion in Michigan u. Sitz, 225 a case dealing with sobriety stops 
by police officers, the Dukes court explained the test for deter-
mining the reasonableness of such administrative searches in 
the following way: 
An administrative search is upheld as reasonable when the 
intrusion involved in the search is no greater than necessary 
to satisfy the governmental interest underlying the need for 
the search. In other words, in determining whether the search 
is reasonable, the courts balance the degree of intrusion, in-
cluding the discretion given to the person conducting the 
search, against the severity of the danger imposed.226 
Upholding the search as reasonable, the Dukes court de-
scribed the metal detector search as minimally intrusive. 227 
Moreover the security officer who conducted the search was 
required to follow "a very detailed script" based upon guidelines 
adopted by the public school system's chancellor. 228 For example 
students are searched by officers of the same sex.229 Officers 
search all students unless lines become too long, then they 
search randomly (i.e., every second or third student).230 The 
officer is not permitted to select any particular student unless 
there is reasonable suspicion that the student has a weapon. 231 
If the device sounded and the student refused to be searched 
further, the student would be handed over to a school adminis-
trator standing nearby. 232 In addition the court stated that its 
decision was made easier considering the compelling need for 
security in schools.233 
Subsequent courts addressing metal detector searches in 
Chicago234and Philadelphia have rendered opinions similar to 
225. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
226. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 852. 
227. ld. 
228. !d. 
229. Id. at 851. 
230. See id. 
231. See Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 851. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. at 853 (pointing out that over 2,000 weapons had been recovered in 
the New York City public schools during 1990-1991, and that there had been a fatal 
shooting in a Brooklyn high school only a few months before the Dukes search). 
_234. See People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding Chicago 
pohce officers to a reasonableness standard when assisting in random metal detector 
search at public high school). 
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that of Dukes. 235 In these cases the searches were conducted by 
either police officers or school security guards and were found to 
be reasonable under the administrative search doctrine. 236 
In 1996, a Florida court went one step further in its interpre-
tation of administrative searches.237 In this case, a high school 
with an open campus instituted a policy allowing random 
searches with hand-held metal detector wands of students in 
classrooms.238 An independent security team hired by the school 
district came into one room to search and observed students 
passing a jacket to the back of the room.239 The officers confis-
cated the jacket and found a gun.240 A Florida court of appeals 
ruled that the standard for the search was one of reasonableness 
and the search was administrative and not a police search re-
quiring probable cause.241 
2. Blanket or Random Locker Searches 
In the T.L.O. decision, the Supreme Court did not decide 
whether students had an expectation of privacy in their lock-
ers.242 After T.L.O. most lower courts have viewed lockers as 
school property and students as having at least a reduced expec-
tation of privacy. Thus, even when police or school security 
guards are involved, courts have generally found blanket or 
random locker searches reasonable243 (assuming there had been 
some notice given to the students in advance that lockers are the 
property of the school and would be subject to such searches)244 
235. See In the Interest of S.S., 680 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that 
a metal detector scan and subsequent search of a coat pocket by a school security 
officer was an administrative search and justified). 
236. See Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d at 547, 549, 551; In the Interest of S.S., 680 A.2d at 
1176. See also People v. Latasha W., _ P.2d _ (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding Los 
Angeles school policy allowing daily, random metal detector searches, provided some 
neutral criteria was used in deciding what persons would be searched). 
237. See Florida v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
238. See id. at 318. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. at 319, 320. 
242. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 n.5. 
243. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 352 (Pa. 1998) (upholding principal-
initiated, random "safety inspection" search for drugs of 2,000 lockers by two police 
officers). 
244. See People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366, 366-68 (N.Y. 1969) (finding warrant 
invalid but upholding the search on the grounds that school officials have an obligation 
to maintain discipline over students where three detectives obtained a warrant to 
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and permissible under the administrative search doctrine be-
cause the searches are relatively unobtrusive and are generally 
concerned with a threat to health and safety (i.e., aimed at re-
moving rotting food or finding drugs or weapons). 245 
In at least some instances, these random locker searches 
have extended to items inside the lockers.246 For example, in the 
Isiah B. case, Madison High School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
experienced a rash of gun-related complaints or incidents.247 
Within a month, high school administrators investigated five to 
six incidents where guns were said to have been on school prop-
erty and verified the existence of guns in two of these in-
stances.248 After two incidents involving threats to the same 
student, this student transferred to another school. 249 The 
school's principal decided to institute locker searches after stu-
dents reported being fired at while leaving a Friday night game 
and hearing multiple shots after a Saturday-night school 
dance. 250 
A school security aide visually inspected the lockers, moving 
articles inside to facilitate the observation.251 After the aide had 
searched some 75-100 lockers, and found nothing, he searched 
search two students and their lockers, presented the warrant to the vice-principal, and 
searched the students as well as their lockers, discovering that Overton's locker 
contained four marijuana cigarettes). 
245. A search of a specific student's locker for contraband, however, would still be 
subject to the reasonableness test set forth in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (setting forth 
two-pronged test for reasonableness). See, e.g., S.C. v. Mississippi, 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 
1991) (upholding a warrantless search of student's locker when there was a report that 
he planned to sell two handguns in his possession); State v. Michael G., 748 P.2d 17 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that locker search was reasonable based on student 
informant's report that the student had tried to sell him marijuana); S.A. v. Indiana, 
654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. App. 1995). See also Eugene C. Bjorklun, School Locker Searches 
and the Fourth Amendment, 92 ED. LAW REP. 1065 (1995) (distinguishing between 
searches of lockers with individualized suspicions and those without). 
246. Compare In the interest of Isiah B., 500 N.W. 2d 637 (Wis. 1993) (upholding 
random locker search which resulted in a gun and cocaine being found in the pocket 
of a coat that was in the locker) and In the Interest of Dumas, 515 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa. 
Super 1986) (concluding that students do not lose their expectation of privacy in purses 
and jackets by merely storing them in a locker). 
247. In the interest of Isiah B., 500 N.W. 2d 637, 638 (Wis. 1993). 
248. See id. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. Evidence of a gun was found in at least one of these situations. Also, 
lockers were said to be searched on a random basis; however, testimony was vague as 
to what constituted "random." 
251. See id. at 639. 
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Isiah B.'s locker, moving the student's coat, to one side.252 As the 
aide moved the coat, he noticed that it seemed unusually heavy; 
he patted its exterior, and felt a hard object, which he believed 
to be a gun.253 The security aide immediately notified the princi-
pal. But before the principal came, the aide observed the handle 
of a gun after he had pulled open a pocket.254 Isiah B. was con-
fronted with this evidence; he admitted that he also had cocaine 
in the same coat pocket.255 
There had been no individualized suspicion for the locker 
search. 256 Isiah B. had no history of prior weapons violations, nor 
was he suspected of such use before the search.257 Nonetheless 
Wisconsin's Supreme Court ruled that this search was legal 
because students have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their lockers. 258 
3. Canine Sniff Searches 
Most mass searches of lockers involving police also involve 
canines. The United States Supreme Court responded to the 
legality of dog sniffing in United States v. Place. 259 In Place the 
Court held that dog sniffs of personal property do not constitute 
a Fourth Amendment search because they are limited in the 
way information is obtained and in the contents of the informa-
tion revealed.260 The Court also noted that the police may tempo-
rarily detain personal luggage for a canine sniff if there is a 
reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics. 261 
To control the use and sale of drugs in public schools, school 
officials sometimes invite police and their dogs into the school to 
sniff out contraband.262 In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent 
School District,263 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
252. See lsiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 639. 
253. See id. 
254. See id. 
255. See id. 
256. See id. 
257. See Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 639. 
258. See id. at 641. 
259. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
260. See id. at 707. 
261. See id. at 708-09. 
262. See KERN ALEXANDER & DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 341 
(3d ed. 1992). 
263. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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Fifth Circuit found that dog sniffing of lockers and cars was 
constitutional.264 The court reasoned that lockers and cars were 
inanimate objects located in a public place:265 
Had the principal of the school wandered past the lockers and 
smelled the pungent aroma of marijuana wafting through the 
corridors, it would be difficult to contend that a search had 
occurred .... [T]he use of the dogs' [sic] nose to ferret out the 
scent from inanimate objects in public places is not treated any 
differently. 266 
It is important to note that the Horton court found dog sniff-
ing of students as entirely different from dog sniffing of lockers 
or cars. 267 Reasoning that the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple and not places, the court stated that most persons in our 
society deliberately attempt not to expose the odors emanating 
from their person to the public.268 Further, the court said that 
the intensive sniffing of people, even if done by dogs, is indecent 
and demeaning and therefore is a search under the strictures of 
the Fourth Amendment. 269 
This latter finding was not, however, followed by the Sev-
enth Circuit in the case of Doe v. Renfrow.270 In Renfrow the 
school, with the assistance of the police, used dogs for the gen-
eral, exploratory sniffing of students.271 The school in question 
was experiencing problems with drugs.272 In cooperation with 
the police, the school secured the services of a private agency 
that used dogs to detect drugs. 273 Students were asked to sit 
quietly at their seats while the dog handler led the dogs up and 
down the desk aisles. 274 As a result of the "sniffing," a student 
was searched twice. 275 The second search was a strip search, 
264. See id. at 488. 
265. See id. at 477. 
266. !d. at 477. 
267. See id. at 478. 
268. See Horton, 690 F.2d at 478. 
269. See id. See also ARVAL A. MORRIS, Chapter 6: Constitutional Freedom and 
Government Controls over Students, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
292, 292 (1989). 
270. 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980). 
271. See id. at 91-92. 
272. See Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1015. 
273. See id. at 1016. 
274. See id. 
275. !d. at 1017. 
60 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1999 
over the student's protests that she did not have drugs and had 
never used them.276 No drugs were found. 277 
The court held that the sniff of a dog was not a search be-
cause "[t]he presence of the canine team for several minutes was 
a minimal intrusion at best and not so serious as to invoke the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment."278 At least one lower 
court, in State v. Barrett,279 has extended this logic to uphold 
searches where entire classes of students were requested to 
remove the contents of their pockets and have dogs sniff those 
items for contraband. 280 While the Barrett court asserted that 
dog sniffs were not searches, it did concede that asking students 
to empty their pockets was a search.281 Using the three-part test 
in Vernonia, the court upheld the search, maintaining that there 
is a decreased expectation of privacy in schools, the search was 
relatively unobtrusive, and there is a severe need to deter drug 
use. zsz 
In all these cases, there was at least some police involvement 
and probable cause was not required. This same conclusion 
holds true with subsequent dog sniffing cases where police were 
actively involved in the canine sniffing of automobiles283 and 
lockers.284 In one of these cases, Commonwealth v. Cass, 285 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld random locker searches 
conducted by police officers at the request of school administra-
tors.286 
In Cass, administrators at Harborcreek High School, after 
observing numerous occurrences of what appeared to be suspi-
cious student behavior including frequent phone calls, use of 
276. See id. 
277. See Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1015. It was later discovered that the student 
had been playing with her dog that morning and that the dog was in heat. 
278. !d. at 1020. On the other hand, the court found that the strip search had 
violated the student's Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 1025. 
279. 683 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 1996). 
280. See Barrett, 683 So. 2d at 337 (La. App. 1996). 
281. See id. 
282. See id. at 338. 
283. See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 313, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1989). 
But see Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 334, 335 (E.D. Tex. 1980) 
(holding that the school did not have sufficient interest to search automobiles when 
students did not have access to them during the day and that canine sniff searches of 
students require individualized suspicion). 
284. See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981). 
285. 709 A.2d 350 (1998). 
286. See id. at 352. 
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beepers, and the carrying of large amounts of money, requested 
the state police to conduct canine sniffs of student lockers. 287 
Drugs were found in only one of the 2,000 lockers searched 
where drug paraphernalia and a small amount of marijuana 
was seized. The student was sent to the principal's office and 
read his rights. 288 In rendering its decision, the Cass court used 
the Fourth Amendment as well as state law to determine that 
the search was reasonable. 
The majority opinion in Cass did not distinguish this case 
because police were involved. Justice Zappala, in a scathing 
dissent, expressed serious concerns about this involvement, 
concluding that this was a police search and should have re-
quired a warrant. 289 
To characterize the locker search in this case as a search by 
school officials is to engage in subterfuge. Appellee's school 
locker was searched by police officers and the contraband 
seized as a result thereof formed the basis of a criminal prose-
cution .... This case does not present the question of what 
degree of scrutiny is appropriate when reviewing a constitu-
tional challenge to a search conducted by school officials on 
school property; rather it presents the question of what degree 
of scrutiny is appropriate when reviewing a constitutional 
challenge to an evidentiary search conducted by police officers 
on school property. 290 
VI. STANDARDS USED WHEN SCHOOL SECURITY 
GUARDSAREINVOLVEDINSCHOOLSEARCHES 
Security guards are often used by school districts to assist 
with school safety and discipline. 291 In determining the appropri-
ate standard, (i.e., reasonable suspicion or probable cause) the 
key question is often whether security guards are acting as 
school officials or as law enforcement officers. The answer to this 
question generally hinges on whether the guards are employed 
by the school system and whether they are working in the capac-
ity of a school official. Depending on the fact patterns of specific 
cases, courts have rendered differing opinions about the stan-
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
289. Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 373 (1998) (Zappala, J., dissenting). 
290. Id. at 367. 
291. See Rossow, supra note 30, at 30. 
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dard security guards must satisfy when they conduct student 
searches. 
When school security guards are not employees of the school 
system, are not working in the capacity of school officials, have 
initiated the search, and have conducted the search for criminal 
evidence, the applicable standard is probable cause. This situa-
tion is well illustrated in F.P. v. State, 292 which involved Jackie 
Flint, a school resource officer, who was an employee of the sher-
iff's office but paid by the school board.293 Ms. Flint's job was to 
handle law enforcement in the school.294 
In this case, Ms. Flint received information from an investi-
gator for the Tallahassee Police Department that a crime had 
been committed by F.P., a student in the middle school.295 The 
investigator discovered this lead after interviewing a student in 
the school who implicated his classmate, F.P. The student stated 
that F.P. had stolen a car and the keys were in F.P.'s posses-
sion.296 Acting on the information, Ms. Flint brought F.P. to her 
office where she discovered F.P. had the keys. 297 The trial court 
found the search reasonable, but the state appeals court re-
versed on the grounds that the school official exception to the 
probable cause requirement for a warrantless search did not 
apply. 298 As the court pointed out, "even if Flint's apparently 
dual role as a school official and a law enforcement officer were 
not considered, the fact that she acted at the behest of a police 
officer requires ... that there existed probable cause to believe 
[F.P.] had violated the law and had in his possession evidence of 
that violation."299 
This issue of dual role as school official and law enforcement 
officer is the most problematic in determining the appropriate 
standard, and the courts are divided on it. In an earlier decision, 
People v. Bowers,300 a New York appeals court held that when a 
high school security officer requested a student to empty the 
contents of a manilla envelope protruding from the student's 
292. 528 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
293. See id. at 1254 n.l. 
294. See id. 
295. See id. at 1254. 
296. See id. 
297. F.P., 528 So. 2d at 1254. 
298. See id. at 1255. 
299. !d. 
300. 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
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pocket and allegedly containing marijuana, the search was not 
legal in that it required probable cause.301 
The Bowers court maintained that a security guard's reason 
for being in school differed from that of a school official and that 
school officials have a relationship with students different from 
that of security guards hired to maintain school safety and han-
dle disturbances and acts of crime.302 The court went on to state 
that security guards serve no official educational function as do 
school officials.303 A security officer acting without the direction 
of school officials must satisfY the probable cause standard, or 
any evidence turned over to the police for use in a criminal pros-
ecution cannot be used. 304 At the time of the Bowers decision, 
New York City school security officers were appointed by the 
police commissioner pursuant to the Administrative Code of the 
City of New York and were paid by the Board ofEducation. 305 
On the other hand, in State v. Serna,306 an Arizona appeals 
court maintained that security guards, who are employed by the 
school system, work in the capacity of school officials and, thus, 
are only held subject to a standard of reasonableness. 307 In ren-
dering its decision for the school district, the Serna Court stated: 
[P]ublic high school security guards employed by the school 
are agents of the high school principal ... [and] a warrantless 
search of a student by a public high school security guard is 
subject to Fourth Amendment considerations and is measured 
by the standard of reasonableness under all of the surrounding 
circumstances. 308 
In the Serna case, Earl Starks, the chief of security at Carl 
Hayden High School received a radio communication from the 
principal's office to take his staff to an area where students were 
allegedly involved in a fight with sticks, rocks, and possibly 
weapons.:309 When the guards reached the area, they saw a stu-
301. See id. at 436. 
302. See id. at 435-36. 
303. See id. at 435. 
304. See id. 
305. See Bowers, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 435. 
306. 860 P.2d 1320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). 
307. See id. at 1322. 
308. Id. at 1322. See also Pamela Manson, Search Laws Ruled Binding on School 
Guards, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 21, 1993, at B2. 
309. See id. 
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dent take something from under the bushes and put it in his 
pocket.310 They suspected the student possessed drugs after see-
ing a plastic baggie in his pocket.311 The student ultimately 
turned the baggie over to a police officer; the baggie was later 
determined to contain cocaine.312 
The student was found guilty of cocaine possession and 
placed on probation.313 He later appealed the conviction on the 
grounds that the evidence found was the result of an unreason-
able search.314 The Serna court said the search was reasonable, 
noting that the school has a "substantial interest" in providing a 
safe environment where learning can take place, a task that has 
become more difficult because of an increase in drug use and 
violent crime.315 
In S.A. v. State316 an Indiana court of appeals also viewed 
school security officers as school personnel and thus subject to 
the reasonableness standard.317 In this case there was a rash of 
student locker break-ins at Howe High School in Indianapolis.318 
The lockers were not damaged and the guidance counselor no-
ticed that her book containing the master lock combinations was 
missing from her office.319 Based on a tip from one of the stu-
dents, Officer Grooms of the Indianapolis Public School Police 
Department (IPSPD) searched several students' lockers, includ-
ing S.A.'s, to no avail.320 The next day there was another break-
in and the same student told Officer Grooms that S.A. had the 
missing book in his blue book bag.321 Officer Grooms' assistant 
removed S.A. from his class, escorted him to his locker to get his 
book bag, and then took him to the principal's office where 
Grooms searched the bag and found the book.322 After first deny-
310. See id. 
311. See Serna, 860 P.2d at 1322. 
312. See id. 
313. See id. at 1321 
314. See id. at 1323. 
315. !d. at 1323-24. 
316. 654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. App. 1995). 
317. See id. at 795, 
318. See id. at 794. 
319. See id. 
320. See id. 
321. See S.A., 654 N.E.2d at 794. 
322. See id. 
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ing it, S.A. later admitted to taking the book as well as jackets 
from some student lockers.323 
S.A. was charged with two counts of theft, which, if he had 
been an adult would have amounted to Class D felonies. 324 He 
was adjudicated a delinquent and sentenced to probation.325 
Both the juvenile court and the Indiana appeals court denied 
S.A.'s motion to suppress the evidence.326 Ruling that S.A.'s 
rights had not been violated,327 the appeals court applied this 
logic: 
S.A. argues that T.L.O. is inapplicable to his situation, because 
his search was conducted by a police officer rather than a 
school official. We disagree. While Officer Grooms is a trained 
police officer, he was acting in his capacity as security officer 
for the IPS schools. Grooms is employed by the IPS PD and as 
such, his conduct regarding student searches on school pre-
mises is governed by the test announced in T.L.0. 328 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This section summarizes the legal issues and problems aris-
ing from police involvement in schools and proposes that stu-
dents be subject to the same legal standards as adults when 
police and security guards are involved in school searches. 
A. Legal Issues Related to Police Involvement in Public Schools 
The law regarding police involvement in student searches is 
clear in several respects. For example, if police initiate a search 
of students in public schools and if that search is for evidence of 
a criminal offense rather than violation of a school rule, then the 
probable cause standard clearly applies. lfpolice are involved in 
the search, but the search is at the behest of the school adminis-
trator, then the reasonable suspicion standard applies and the 
test for reasonableness, as articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
would be used. 
If the search is administrative, such as random locker or 
metal detector searches, then reasonable suspicion is the appro-
323. See id. 
324. See id. 
325. See id. 
326. See S.A., 654 N.E.2d at 794-95. 
327. See id. at 795. 
328. ld. 
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priate standard and the three-part test articulated in Vernonia 
v. Acton (need, expectation of privacy, obtrusiveness of the 
search) would most likely be used. Here, the individual's expec-
tation of privacy would be balanced against the governmental 
interest (e.g., school safety). 
As for school security guards, if these individuals are acting 
in the capacity of police officers, or at the behest of the police, 
then they are subject to the probable cause standard. If they are 
acting as school officials or at the behest of school officials, or if 
the search is administrative in nature, then the reasonable sus-
picion standard applies. 
B. Legal Problems Arising from Police Involvement in Public 
Schools 
When a police search does not fall into one of the categories 
already mentioned, it is not clear which legal standard applies. 
Examples of this include police involvement in a school search 
when school officials work in conjunction with the police, but 
neither the police nor the school officials are completely direct-
ing the search; or when school officials work so closely with each 
other that it is impossible to decide who actually directed the 
search. 
A similar problem occurs when school security guards take 
on a role that is more like that of police officers than of school 
officials. This may occur either because of past professional ex-
periences as law enforcement officers; current responsibilities 
that include assisting with school discipline, safety, and law 
enforcement issues; or personal/professional relationships with 
the police. When this happens, an agency relationship occurs 
between school officials and the police. Because the test relies on 
the subjective state of mind of both the school official and the 
police, determining whether an agency relationship exists is 
difficult. 3~9 As one commentator has noted, "While motive and 
intent of each participant in the search may be determined by 
circumstantially relevant objective facts, the test relies too 
heavily on factors prone to ambiguity and fabrication."330 
Probably the most significant issue from a public policy point 
ofview is what is done with the evidence obtained in the search. 
329. See Perrin, supra note 95, at 172. 
330. ld. 
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Even though the "silver platter" doctrine prohibits school admin-
istrators from working at the behest of the police, it could be 
argued that the outcome is the same when state laws require 
administrators to report criminal conduct to the police. In the 
latter situation, school personnel are able to collect information 
and evidence without a warrant or probable cause, and this 
information and evidence can then be used to prosecute students 
criminally. Also, police presence during the search, even though 
the search is conducted by a school official, can be an invasion of 
students' rights. If the search uncovers evidence of a crime, and 
the school official hands over the evidence to the police, the evi-
dence can be used against the student. 331 
This problem becomes even more complex in light of current 
trends toward treating juveniles as adults for certain criminal 
offenses. If juveniles are tried as adults, then they should be 
afforded the same protection as adults. 
C. Proposed Solutions to the Legal Dilemma 
Considering the ambiguity involved in the relationships 
between school officials and the police, the resultant ambiguity 
in the law, and the fact that students involved in criminal of-
fenses in the schools often are turned over to the police, the solu-
tion to this problem seems to lie in crafting uniform standards. 
In other words, if police are involved in school searches, then 
they should be subject to the same standards that police nor-
mally use. Also, depending upon their backgrounds and famil-
iarity with law enforcement, school security guards should be 
subject to the same standards as police officers. 
Hence, the standard for administrative searches such as 
metal detector searches, blanket locker searches, and drug test-
ing should be the reasonable suspicion standard. On the other 
hand, when the search is an individual search that involves 
police, the standard should be probable cause. Granted, it is 
important that the special environment and unique circum-
stances of schools be considered. Thus, no warrant would be 
necessary. But the stricter standard should still apply. As noted 
331. See, e.g., State v. S.A., 654 N.E. 2d. 791, 794-795 (Ind. App. 1995) (denying 
student's motion to suppress evidence found in a locker search conducted by school 
police officers); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992) (denying 
motion to suppress when school authorities turned over the evidence to police). See also 
supra note 13. 
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earlier in this article, Justice Stevens observed in his concurring 
opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O. that the reasonable suspicion 
standard would spare school officials "the necessity of schooling 
themselves in the niceties of probable cause."332 However, if 
school authorities are working in conjunction with the police, 
this relationship would also spare school authorities the need to 
understand the intricacies of probable cause, because education 
in the "niceties of probable cause" is part and parcel of both the 
training and every day work oflaw enforcement officers.333 
In addition, if police are involved in the search, and the 
search is for contraband that would eventually be turned over to 
law enforcement authorities, then the police, by the very nature 
of their involvement, are the agents of the search. They, not 
school officials, are the state authorities who will be involved in 
the ultimate proceedings and will benefit from the fruits of a 
legal search. 
It is true that school safety is of vital importance, especially 
in today's society, and courts have always been concerned that 
school officials be provided considerable leeway in administering 
schools.334 This plan would still allow for ample administrative 
discretion. It would make no changes in any searches conducted 
by school administrators without the police. The standard for 
administrative searches, even those involving police and secu-
rity guards, would remain as reasonable suspicion. 
The only changes would be in searches that are not regula-
tory but involve the police or school security personnel acting in 
the capacity of police, who are searching for evidence to use in 
criminal proceedings. In this type of search the standard should 
be probable cause, a standard that, as Justice Brennan has 
pointed out, would likely be met anyway.335 Considerable discre-
tion would still exist under this standard because exceptions to 
the warrant requirement would still apply.336 For example, in 
332. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985). 
333. Id. 
334. See, e.g., Board of. Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853, 885 (1982) (maintaining that courts cannot become a "super censor" of 
the school board); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (recognizing that school officials must have 
the freedom to maintain order); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(asserting that school authorities need discretionary authority "to function with great 
efficiency and speed in certain situations"). 
335. See T.L.O. at 364-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
336. See id. at 367. 
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cases of great danger and those calling for immediacy, the emer-
gency exception would still allow school officials and police to 
search without a warrant.337 Such a plan would end the confu-
sion as to when to apply reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause in police-related school searches. Moreover, it would re-
store the balance between students' Fourth Amendment rights 
and school administrators' responsibilities to maintain order 
and discipline in the schools, a balance that was proposed in 
T.L.O. but, in recent years, as many commentators have pointed 
out, has gradually eroded the privacy rights of students.338 
If we are to teach students about constitutional guarantees, 
then it is only fair that we also ensure these same students that 
such guarantees apply to them. Affording students these 
protections in relation to police searches in schools would go far 
in teaching students and ourselves, as educators and scholars, a 
most valuable lesson about the importance of both rights and 
responsibilities in a democracy. 
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338. See, e.g., Joan E. Imbriani, Metal Detectors in Public Schools: A Subtle 
Sacrifice of Privacy Interests, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 198 (1995); Sunil H. 
Mansukhani, School Searches after New Jersey v. T.L.O. :Are there any Limits?, 34 U. 
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 345 (1995-1996); Thomas C. Fischer, From Tinker to T.L.O.; Are 
Civil Rights for Students Flunking in School? 22 J.L. & Enuc. 409 (1993). 
